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COPYRIGHT AND THE CONSTITUTION IN
THE AGE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
The Twenty-Second Annual Donald Brace Memorial Lecture, given to the
Copyright Society of America at Columbia Law School, April 22, 1992.
Reprinted substantially as given, with the addition of footnotes for
clarity.
David Lange*
As I've thought about the things I might say on this occasion, I've
found my memory returning again and again to Mel Nimmer, and
especially to the occasion when I first met him. It was in Chicago,
in the winter of 1973, at one of those otherwise dreary professional
conferences that flee from the mind almost as soon as they are
over. I've long since forgotten the subject, but I have never
forgotten the occasion. And I want to begin my remarks by telling
you this story.
I was then still a young man, and new to the academy; copyright
and intellectual property had been given to me to teach as much
because there was no one else who wanted to do it as because I
myself had asked for it, though in fact I had asked for it and was
glad of the opportunity. In practice, in the decade preceding, I had
represented what today we would call eptertainment clients
(though at the time we thought of them as media clients), and I
had encountered intellectual property doctrines along the way, as
one does in such a practice. But teaching copyright was something
at which I was still very much the novice when I first met Mel
Nimmer that winter in Chicago.
I know some of you will remember him yourselves: his kindness,
his warmth, his generosity, his wit-and of course, his enormous,
encyclopedic knowledge of this field of copyright, which by then he
had already come to dominate with his "great work."1 I was
somewhat in awe of him, I suppose; and yet within moments of our
introduction I felt not merely that I had known him for a very long
while but that, somehow, he had always been my mentor. And he
* David Lange, Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law.
Donahue v. Ziv Television Programs, Inc., 54 Cal. Rptr. 130, 142 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1966) (referring to MELvILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIAMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT (1992)).
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did become a mentor: in the years that followed, even after what
I know he sometimes thought of as my apostasy, Mel always was
open to my inquiries and my arguments alike, which he treated
with the same patient, gentle collegial courtesy whether or not he
agreed with me. He was a full-spirited man, and it gives me
pleasure to remember him, on any occasion.
But on the occasion of this lecture, I remember him particularly
for something striking he said in that first conversation in Chicago.
I was teaching intellectual property from a casebook I found
difficult: the copyright seemed clear enough in its main outlines,
but the other doctrines seemed to me to be-well, not so much
confusing in themselves, nor merely inconsistent with copyright,
but rather profoundly inconsistent with some essential underpin-
ning in the field of copyright which intuition led me to suspect
ought to be essential in these other fields as well. And this
inconsistency seemed especially troublesome in the particular sense
that all of the protections copyright seemed to offer could be swept
away merely by shifting doctrinal grounds-by moving, say, from
the rule in copyright that an artist's style is not protected (which
means that other artists are free to work in that style if they
choose to do so) to a rule in an adjacent field of law, like unfair
competition, in which look-alikes and sound-alikes actually may be
forbidden to work.
I asked Mel what he thought about this. I said, "How do you
handle the problem of these other disciplines when you teach
copyright?" And what he said was this: "Well, I don't, necessarily.
Understand, that what I am is a copyright lawyer. And a copyright
lawyer doesn't necessarily traffic in the rest of intellectual proper-
ty."
Now we all need to understand, as I came eventually to do
myself: what Mel said that day was not to be taken literally,
without qualification. Recall that his own professional career had
begun with the publication of an article in Law & Contemporary
Problems in which he had painstakingly, and brilliantly, outlined
a new intellectual property right he called "the right of publici-
ty"-an article which was a tour de force, both in analysis and
imagination, as well as one of the purest examples of American
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legal realism ever penned.2 And recall as well that it was Mel
Nimmer who wrote, on another occasion, of "distilling new wine in
old bottles."' Mel Nimmer, in short, knew as much as any person
alive about the utility in shifting doctrinal grounds.
And yet there was a certain innocence in this remark-an
innocence in time and place-that stays with me to this day. Those
of you who are as old as I am now, or older, will know that in a
very real sense what Mel said was simply true. This was almost
twenty years ago, after all, and Mel himself was reflecting on a
career which had started some years earlier, when the formal
constraints among intellectual property disciplines were consider-
ably more secure than they are today. We might have thought
about shifting from one doctrine to another; but in fact it was not
as easy to do as it was to contemplate. Legal formalism might have
been in sharp decline, but judges tended still to suppose somehow
that "the law wished to have a formal existence."4 Cases tended,
accordingly, to stay within accustomed doctrinal boundaries.
Times have changed. Nancy Sinatra lost her "sound alike" claim
in that long ago time;5 Bette Midler won hers just this month.'
In the distance between these two suits lies movement in our field
which is not merely striking, but compelling.
Part of what we are compelled to recognize in this movement is
clearly beneficial. As intellectual property doctrines have become
more flexible, so has our productivity increased in the valuable
products this system recognizes and nurtures. As intellectual
property doctrines have become increasingly "harmonized" the
world around, so has our ability to generate exports become more
viable as well. A substantial part of this country's exports this year
will be in the form of intellectual property-and much of those
exports will be in the form of interests that would have been
2 Melville B. Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 203 (1954).
8 2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMM_, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8.21(B) (1992).
' Cf Stanley Fish, The Law Wishes to Have a Formal Exdstence, in THE FATE OF LAW 159
(Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1991).
s Sinatra v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 435 F.2d 711 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402
U.S. 906 (1971) (holding that use of song associated with celebrity and imitation of celebrity's
singing voice in advertisement did not constitute unfair competition under California law).
' Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988) (upholding tort cause of action
for imitation of celebrity's singing voice in advertisement), cert. denied, sub nom. Midler v.
Young & Rubicam, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 1513 (1992).
1993]
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problematic, at best, twenty years ago.
But the moral claims in an expanded field of intellectual property
remain harder to assess. Let's take the case of publicity rights
again, for example. How do we decide where the moral balance lies
in the case of publicity? I have no doubt-well, let's say I have
very little doubt-that a living individual, like the great Bobby
Hurley, should be able to control commercial uses that might be
made of his name, personality or likeness. If Dolly Madison were
still alive I'm sure I would feel the same way about her. But do I
care that her name appears today on packages of cupcakes? Do I
care that Sigmund Freud's likeness may appear next week on a
new cigar? In truth, I don't, and neither do you, in all likelihood.
Dolly Madison is dead, and so is Freud, and so are all who were
near and dear to them.
But then, these aren't really the hard moral cases, are they?
After all, the hard cases are the ones in which the immediate heirs
(or successors or assigns) of dead poets (or whatever) claim a
continuing monetary interest in their predecessor's personam. I
know how these cases come out, as I know you do too: commercial
appropriations (involving, say, the use of Groucho Marx's likeness
on a new cigar) are vulnerable to the publicity claims; more
aspiring artistic appropriations (such as a novelistic or movie
treatment of Agatha Christie) are also vulnerable, but far less so.
Analytically this may seem right; but intuitively the decisions still
leave much of the issue in doubt. Why should we favor the heirs
of dead celebrities where mere money is concerned? Why not
encourage them just to start singing, "heigh ho! heigh ho!" and trot
on off to work like the rest of us? And meanwhile, what about
Dame Agatha's children and grandchildren? Have we no pity?
Meanwhile, difficult as I think these essentially communal moral
questions are, they pale at the side of the real issue, which is: how
do we justify even the marginal intrusions into the public domain
which the publicity doctrines continue to allow, no matter how
carefully we may try to control them? And here, let me make it
clear, the exercise is not to resolve a common moral question, but
rather the far more difficult challenge of justifying an encroach-
[Vol. 1:119
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ment upon our personal ability to engage in creative play
Probably I shouldn't have been so cavalier in my disregard for
Sigmund Freud, because now I actually come to the point in my
remarks where I need him. My thesis at this point is simple, but
important: I believe that we are born with an innate urge to
engage in creative play-an urge which is not merely constructed
from our discourses with each other, nor merely an artifact of a
particular society at a particular point in time, but is, instead,
essential in all of humankind. Antiformalists, some post-modern-
ists, deconstructionists and other post-structuralists, New Historic-
ists, and others of their ilk-who believe that we are born tabula
rasa, only to invent ourselves from the essence of our own language
and history-will vigorously disagree, to say the least; but I am
adamant in my conviction. And I think I can claim the support of
Doctor Freud, if I have not succeeded in so alienating him as to
drive his shade from the field. Certainly in his writings, at least,
he suggested that the urge to express ourselves through creative
play is innate; and while he imagined that the origins of that urge
could be further dissected, still he did not appear to doubt, in any
of his work, ever, that we are, for whatever reasons, creatures born
to play. Creativity in adult life, he added, is merely an extension
of this innate playful urge.8
If this is so-and certainly I do subscribe to it-then it is fair to
argue, as I have done elsewhere, that we are born, in a very real
sense, to play in the fields of the Word.9
Which brings us once again to the real difficulty with the right
of publicity-and with all of the other parvenu intellectual property
doctrines that have conspired to absorb our beloved copyright
within the past few decades. What they confront us with is an
obligation not unknown in the law, but one still relatively rare:
namely, to justify our intrusions into activities-in this case, the
activities of creative self-expression-which are as natural to us,
' Cf White v. Samsung Elec. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski, J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2443 (1993).8 See, e.g., 9 SIGMUND FREUD, Creative Writers and Day-Dreaming, in THE STANDARD
EDITION OF THE COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD 143 (James Strachey
et al. eds. and trans., 1953).
' See David Lange, At Play in the Fields of the Word: Copyright and the Construction of
Authorship in the Post-Literate Millennium, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1992, at 139.
1993] 123
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and as essential, and as unavoidable, as breathing.
Something of this insight may have been in my mind when I
asked Mel Nimmer the question I did all those years ago. But, if
so, it was no more than a dim sense of a reality yet to dawn.
Certainly, I did not truly understand how profound this challenge
was, and is, until, by chance, I encountered it face to face some
years later. For me this encounter was nothing short of an
epiphany. Let me tell you how it came about.
It was early in 1979. I had agreed to participate in an ABA
program at the Beverly Wilshire, sponsored by the Forum Commit-
tee on the Entertainment and Sports Industries. My job was to
talk about the right of publicity, which, as you may recall, was just
then a matter on appeal in two cases pending in the California
Supreme Court, in which the questions had to do with the suscepti-
bility of the public lives of dead celebrities to subsequent appropria-
tion in fiction.1°
I flew to California expecting to speak to lawyers who, like
myself, probably would find these doctrinal developments intrigu-
ing, if not necessarily appealing. But what I found when I arrived
was that a number of Hollywood screenwriters were in the
audience, and as their questions followed I realized that whatever
interest this subject might hold for them intellectually was wholly
outweighed by the threat they felt to their very ability to continue
working. And I need to emphasize that when I say "working" what
I mean is, "go on creating." For what was at stake for these
writers, or so they feared, was not merely their livelihoods, but
their very lives. How could they create, they asked, if the raw
materials they had been accustomed to using were to be taken from
them? And on what basis could such an appropriation be justified?
It was in these questions, and others like them, that I sensed a
deeper question I now found most telling: "Do you lawyers not
recognize the public domain?"
Well, I had supposed that we did. But now I had to ask: what
does it mean to recognize the public domain?
' Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prod., 603 P.2d 454 (Cal. 1979) (holding right of publicity
not descendible under California law); Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425 (Cal. 1979)
(holding right of publicity to be personal and exercisable only during celebrity's lifetime
under California law).
124 [V/ol. 1:119
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I asked that question seriously, of myself and others, in the
aftermath of that talk in Beverly Hills, and I came eventually to
the point at which I thought it was possible to suggest some
tentative answers." Certainly we do not have to reject intellectu-
al property outright in order to have a decent regard for the public
domain. But we do have to recognize something about intellectual
property which makes it unlike other species of property, namely,
that it almost always exists in an intangible res:
The hypothetical nature of intellectual property
means that boundaries inevitably prove troublesome
to fix. Rarely can we be sure that our perception of
a particular interest is more than an approximation
of someone else's perception of the same interest.
And unlike real estate or personalty, intellectual
property is subject to unlimited recreation in the
mind of each observer. This causes trouble enough
in the task of establishing recognizable boundaries.
But the real difficulty arises from the fact that more
than one person sensibly may assert a proprietary
interest in what looks like the same property.
Learned Hand's useful dictum [about Keats' "Ode on
a Grecian Urn"] anticipates this phenomenon in the
law of copyright and offers a neat solution. But not
all of these conflicts are so easily resolved. Hand's
dictum is a rule of copyright but not of patents. And
even in copyright, the theory of derivative works
makes no adequate allowance for the copier whose
recreation of an earlier work is also a substantial
improvement. 2
To me, at least, these insights suggest something of the balance
we ought to try to strike:
" See David Lange, Recognizing the Public Domain, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBs., Autumn
1981, at 147.
2 Id. at 150 (footnotes omitted).
1993] 125
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What I woula suppose ... is not that intellectual
property is undeserving of protection, but rather that
such protection as it gets ought to reflect its unique
susceptibility to conceptual imprecision and to
infinite replication. These attributes seem to me to
require the recognition of two fundamental princi-
ples. One is that intellectual property theory must
always accept something akin to a "no man's land" at
the boundaries; doubtful cases of infringement ought
always to be resolved in favor of the defendant. The
other is that no exclusive interest should ever have
affirmative recognition unless its conceptual opposite
is also recognized. Each right ought to be marked off
clearly against the public domain.'3
Recognizing the public domain is something I think we have tried
to do in copyright-not always gracefully or successfully, and not
always ingenuously, either, for that matter-but still, we've made
an effort. Indeed, copyright presupposes such an effort by the very
nature of the bargain struck between the author and society under
the Constitution: the author gets the limited monopoly of copyright
for a limited time, but only in exchange for an eventual dedication
of the work to the public domain. This is the implicit constitutional
transaction, and it is echoed within the doctrinal law in a number
of explicit ways which we need not spend additional time recalling
here.
Our time can be better spent, instead, in enumerating the ways
in which other intellectual property doctrines confront the public
domain, and in seeing how they accommodate themselves to the
challenge. We can't hope to exhaust the field on this occasion but
let's do consider three doctrines, specifically: unfair competition,
trademarks (including the Lanham Act's § 43(a)),14 and dilu-
tion-understanding, of course, that we can only hope to sketch the
dimensions of the problem impressionistically.
When we think of unfair competition in this context, we have to
think not so much of that branch of unfair competition dealing with
Id. (footnotes omitted).
14 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1988).
126 [Vol. 1:119
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fraud, deception or "palming off," as we do of the newer, more
protean branch of unfair competition that some call "misappropria-
tion." You understand the problem here. If I design an industrial
lamp, or a floor lamp, or a boat, you may have every reason in the
world to want to copy my design: if you think it has commercial
appeal, and think also that you can make it better or more
inexpensively-or even if you simply think you can market it more
effectively. That's competition in the marketplace at large. But
sometimes the common law, left to its own devices, calls your
appropriation "unfair competition--and then I may enjoin you
from copying my design on grounds that you and I both will have
trouble explaining to any sensible, fair-minded ten-year-old with no
prior axe to grind. Why do I get to keep the design, and you don't?
Is it that I was first? Surely not; even in an age of rampant
narcissism, that explanation is a non-starter. Is it that I invested
time, money and effort in developing the design? I've read Locke's
Second Treatise, as you have, and I understand that argument up
to a point; but let's remember that what Locke actually said was
that it was sensible to recognize "property" in such circumstances
only when what remained for others was "sufficient" and "as good."
That isn't an easy case to make when what the market wants is a
product fashioned exactly like mine.15
And so far, I've only mentioned competition in industrial settings.
That may be enough where lamps and boats are concerned. But it
clearly isn't enough among artisans, whose commerce and creative
lives are fully intertwined. Among jewelers, for example, or potters
or glassmakers or metalsmiths or rag doll makers or woodworkers,
making the product is also a species of creative play-and this is no
less true when what is being made is not original. You don't have
to take my word for that. Just take a close look the next time you
head for the beach and see for yourself: the child who imitates the
next child's sand castle is enjoying herself every bit as much as if
she had gotten there first. Sometimes, in fact, the art is in the
appropriation. Shakespeare called it "The Winter's Tale." Art
For an elegant Lockean analysis, see Wendy Gordon, A Property Right in Self-
Expression: Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102
YALE L.J. 1533 (1993).
1993] 127
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historians call it "making a find.""6 And so do we when we're not
being intellectual property lawyers.
We're not done here: I've said nothing about defenses, and
nothing in particular about a singular source of defenses-namely
the American Constitution-that is of particular interest in this
context. And we'll come to that presently.
Before we do, though, let's shift doctrinal grounds again-this
time from unfair competition to the adjacent field of trademarks.
Now here the theories are rarely anything so straightforwardly
crude as simple "misappropriation." No, here the driving theories
ordinarily are confusion or mistake or deception in the marketplace.
If my wife and I call our ice cream "Ben & Jerry's," someone might
buy it thinking it's the real Ben & Jerry's, when really it's just
Dave and Terri's-but then, you understand how this works. What
we lawyers want to do is to protect the consumer from the conse-
quences of misleading practices, and we also want to protect the
prior user (or registrant in the case of the Lanham Act) whose
effort and investment are at risk when the consumer is misled. So
far, so good. These are not necessarily unworthy goals.
But it's a funny business, trademarks: if we were Ben and Jerri
(with an "i"), my wife and I might think ourselves ill-used at being
told that we couldn't sell ice cream under our own names. And as
a matter of fact, we wouldn't be told that unless Ben and Jerry I
had established something called secondary meaning in their
names-which I suppose they have. Sometimes there really isn't
room for a second use of a distinctive mark. But sometimes-just
sometimes-proprietors of trademarks are tempted to claim a little
secondary meaning where, if the truth be told, there's probably just
enough of it that if you had that much secondary meaning and a
token you could catch a ride, one-way, on the Staten Island Ferry.
I've seen cases like that. If you're a trademark lawyer, so have you.
And that's troublesome, but that's not all. Some judges can't
distinguish between appropriation and confusion: in the First
Circuit, for example-and for that matter, elsewhere-we have a
rule that says deliberate copying of a trademark raises a presump-
16 Richard Shift, Making a Find: An Argument for Creativity Not Originality, STRUCTURA-
LIST REv., Spring 1984, at 59.
128 [Vol. 1: 119
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tion of confusion' 7-- which now means that trademark law works
very much as though it were, once again, anchored in whatever-it-is
that makes us frown on "misappropriation." Talk about doctrinal
shifting: plus Va change!
And now, finally, let's add dilution into the mix. As a theory,
this was the brainchild of Harvard Law School's Frank Schechter,
who suggested it in an important article called "The Rational Basis
of Trademark Protection" some sixty-five years ago."8 Here's the
thought behind dilution: if a "highly distinctive" trademark is used
by someone other than its proprietor, even in circumstances in
which there is no confusion or likelihood of confusion or mistake or
deception, the trademark may still suffer from a threat to its
continued distinctiveness; and if it does, that second use ought to
be enjoined. There's actually more to the theory, but this is enough
for our purposes now: what we need to see here, again, is how easy
it is to dispense with "confusion," in favor of protection against
"misappropriation." Some commentators have said that judges
haven't liked dilution for just that reason; but it's quite clear that
the action is gaining ground. There is even some recent case
authority to the effect that dilution may exist at the common law,
rather than-as had been supposed-in statutes enacted by the
states. 9
We've looked, now, at unfair competition, trademark law, and
dilution; and before that, we looked briefly at the right of publicity.
So what is it, then, that we see in these additional intellectual
property doctrines that make them importantly different from
copyright in their response to the challenge of the public do-
main-which is to say, the challenge to justify encroachments into
the free exercise of creative self-expression?
" See Chart House, Inc. v. Bornstein, 636 F.2d 9 (1st Cir. 1980) (holding owner of
registered service marks entitled to preliminary injunction against defendant's use of
coinciding name); Purolator, Inc. v. EFRA Distrib., Inc., 687 F.2d 554 (1st Cir. 1982) (holding
that evidence, including similarities between the products themselves and between their
packaging and styling, supported finding of likelihood of confusion between competing
products).
's Frank Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L. REv. 813
(1927).
" See Storck USA, L.P. v. Levy, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1965 (N.D. IMi. 1991) (holding that
Illinois anti-dilution statute did not supersede common-law dilution claims).
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I'm going to oversimplify my answer to that question, but only
because time and space are short. The longer account would be
more damning still.
What we see in the fields of intellectual property beyond
copyright (and patents, which are circumscribed at least as
satisfactorily as copyright) is a deep and growing appetite for
appropriation simpliciter as the main touch-spring of the device.
Copying and appropriation are concepts which ensnare us twice
over: first, because they are relatively easy to prove; and second,
because, once proven, we assume too much, too easily, about why
they are wrong.
I might be more troubled than I am by the direction intellectual
property has been taking during the past twenty years or so, were
it not for a counter-revolution that has been quietly asserting itself
in just that same space of time. And now I'm referring, of course,
to the increasing role the Constitution has been playing in the field,
which is the subject I want to turn to finally in these comments.
We Americans are more committed to our Constitution, I think
it's fair to say, than are most of the other political states in the
world at this moment in time; and what that means, among many
other things, is that we are committed to a kind of formalism that
otherwise we have all but abandoned. I know you will have
reservations about this statement, to say the least: consider the
evolution of the rights revolution, for example, and of course it
appears as though nothing could be further from the truth. But
bear with me, please. I think the point I'm making is nonetheless
real, and I believe it has some importance for us as intellectual
property lawyers.
When I say we are committed to formalism, through our
commitment to the Constitution, what I mean is simply this: that
our system of law has not yet delivered us into the hands of the
post-structuralists; in the words of my colleague, Stanley Fish, "the
law still wishes to have a formal existence"-and I mean to observe,
merely, that the agency we have designated to give us that
existence is to be found more fully in the Constitution than in any
other source our law affords.
This is important in copyright law because it anchors us in the
very practices that allow us to say that copyright is responsive to
the interests of both commerce and creative self-expression alike.
[Vol. 1:119130
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How many legislative compromises were driven, during the long
passage from the 1909 Act to the 1976 Act, by fundamental
constitutional concerns no one could say with assurance now, but
there were many. And they were accepted in the main, I think it
is fair to say, with the same combination of resignation and grace
that led the good people of Kentucky to accept Christian Laettner's
final basket--sometimes you don't have to like it; you just have
to understand that that's the way it is-it's play within the rules.
That's formalism in practice.
We've been accustomed to playing within the rules in copyright
for a very long time-so long, in fact, that it's sometimes possible
to forget that there are rules, so fully situated are we in the play.
It came as something of a surprise, then, a year ago, to encounter
a case like Feist v. Rural Telephone,21 in which Justice O'Connor
unmistakably grounded her opinion not merely in long-standing
flaws in the doctrinal ground, but also in the deeper requirements
of the Constitution itself. But the surprise is not so much in the
outcome as it is in our ability to "sense the Constitution" in the
process of decision itself.
I have suggested on another occasion that I think that Feist may
signal the Court's intention "to begin the serious business of
bringing to intellectual property the constitutional coherence it
deserves."' To be sure, the opinion alone, though substantially
more discursive in constitutional terms than the issues would have
required, still does not contain anything explicit suggesting a
radical departure from established precedents; it is rather the
decision itself, and the process by which it was reached, that
command attention! We can count on the toes of Long John Silver
the number of occasions on which the Court has invalidated an
aging reign of precedents by reaching out to constitutional doctrines
within the Copyright Clause. In this sense, Feist was, and is, an
event, and I think it portends events to follow.
" Duke Univ. v. Univ. of Kentucky, final score Duke 104-103, E. Regional Finals, NCAA
Div. I Men's Basketball Tournament, Mar. 28, 1992.21 Feist Publications v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991) (holding that information
contained in white pages of telephone directory did not meet constitutional or statutory
requirements for copyright protection).
' David Lange, Sensing the Constitution in Feist, 17 U. DAYTON L. REV. 367 (1992).
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It is possible, of course, to read Feist as though it merely
reinscribes the formal distinctions between copyright and commerce
originally contemplated by the Trade-Mark Cases,' which Justice
O'Connor prominently cites. If so, then, as Paul Goldstein
suggested to you on this occasion a year ago, we may eventually
observe the transfer of a portion of what has belonged to copyright,
in the protection of databases, to some other field of law under the
Commerce power.2 This is a plausible reading of the case; but it
isn't the reading I would give it.
Instead, I would suggest that the Copyright Clause itself may
stand at the threshold of a new era of interpretation in which the
formalist distinctions of the past will give way to new, and more
harmonious, resolutions of the issues we actually confront in
intellectual property today-resolutions better suited, in other
words, to the new intellectual property millennium-yet resolutions
derived finally, once again under the formal auspices of a new
Intellectual Property Clause, a clause newly read as primus inter
pares among other clauses within the Constitution.
I think so for two reasons, and with these reasons, when I have
finished sketching them, I will conclude these remarks, with thanks
for your patience and your kindness in hearing me out.
I think so first simply because there is need now, as never before,
for harmonization among the intellectual property doctrines under
a paramount Intellectual Property Clause. Now that copyright has
been joined by "the barbarians at the gate," either we will harmo-
nize or we will perish. I give you a case that makes my point more
succinctly than I could otherwise hope to do: Recently, in New
York, a judge of the U. S. Federal District Court for the Eastern
District issued a preliminary injunction forbidding the continued
sale of prints and posters that were " 'quite similar in [style and]
general appearances'" to the plaintiffs earlier works.' To a
copyright lawyer, this might at once seem to be a copyright case.
Today, however, it can also be decided, apparently within the limits
of precedent, as though it were a trade dress infringement case
2 Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879).
2 4 See Paul Goldstein, Copyright, LAw & CoNTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1992, at 79, 88-89.
Romm Art Creations, Ltd. v. Simcha Intl, Inc., 786 F. Supp. 1126, 1138 (E.D.N.Y. 1992)
(granting preliminary injunction prohibiting defendant's distribution of posters resembling
plaintiffs fine art posters).
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under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act. In an era without real
rules, decisions like this easily pass as sound doctrinal law.
And I think, meanwhile, that there is precedent for formal
revisionism within the Constitution and its own history of interpre-
tation. I said a few pages ago, as I was speaking of unfair
competition, that I would return to the matter of defenses present-
ly, and I want to do that now, in this context. What's striking
about the defenses to what would otherwise be runaway doctrines
in unfair competition, trademark law, and dilution alike, is that, as
if sensing the need, the Constitution has taken the lead in generat-
ing these defenses. Beginning with the decisions in Sears2' and
Compco27--and surviving the decisions in Goldstein' and Kewan-
ee2--the Court has signaled its intentions to employ the Constitu-
tion to curtail the worst inclinations in a rapidly expanding field.
Bonito Boats'" continues to send that signal. And really, in terms
of constitutional law itself, as a process of interpretation, nothing
could be more natural, or more in accordance with long-standing
precedent: the Court has always reached for whatever tools came
to hand. To use the Supremacy Clause, in the context of intellectu-
al property, is to achieve approximately the converse of what was
achieved through incorporation of the Bill of Rights into the
Fourteenth Amendment.
But the real precedent here is in the First Amendment, and twice
over at that: first, because that amendment has also played a
recurring role in curtailing intellectual property doctrines; and
second, because the First Amendment gives us a striking example
of how a long-dormant provision within the Constitution can spring
suddenly into life when need arises. Today the First Amendment
is all but omnipresent in our lives; we live as though we had
always lived within a system of freedom of expression; and indeed,
I would say, in a sense, we always did-but not because of the First
Amendment: we must remember that the First Amendment did
not begin to be construed until 1919, at the close of the Great War,
when repeated prosecutions of dissidents forced us to think in more
Sears, Roebuck, & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
"Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973).
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974).
'0 Bonito Boats v. Thunder Craft Boats, 489 U.S. 141 (1989).
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formal terms about what it was to be free."' We found it useful
then to envision an expanded First Amendment precisely because
our circumstances justified a formal resolution of that dilemma.
But the First Amendment, even after its expansion, merely
confirmed what had gone before. We lived within a system of
freedom of expression, ultimately, because it is in our character as
Americans to "think as [we please] and to speak as [we] think."
Just so, I would say, it is in our character as Americans-but
also even more deeply and essentially as humans-to wish to be
free to play in the fields of the Word. Copyright has offered us that
promise. In an age of intellectual property, however, copyright
alone can no longer guarantee that promise. An expanded role for
an Intellectual Property Clause offers some hope that we can
restore harmony to a system of rights in which commerce and
creative self-expression will continue to coexist peacefully and
productively.
As was true in 1919 with the First Amendment, so now it may
be with the Intellectual Property Clause: exigent necessity justifies
us in envisioning new, more formal, uses for a dormant provision
of the Constitution. I don't know what Mel Nimmer would think
of this suggestion. I suppose it would depend on his own assess-
ment of the need. But I expect he would understand the thought
behind my suggestions, and I imagine he would approve of the
process. For after all, it was he who taught us all to respect the
practice of distilling "new wine in old bottles."
"' See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919); Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211
(1919); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
"Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring), overruled by
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
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